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Social Utopias of Reformation Epoch – Part 1

Social Utopias of Reformation Epoch – Part 2

Social Utopias of Reformation Epoch – Part 3

 

Thomas More (1478 – 1535)

Sir Thomas More, also known by Catholics as Saint Thomas More, was an English lawyer, social philosopher, author, statesman and noted Renaissance humanist. He was an important counsellor to Henry VIII of England and for three years toward the end of his life, he was Lord Chancellor. He is recognized as a saint within the Catholic Church and is commemorated by the Church of England as a ‘Reformation martyr’. He was an opponent of the Protestant Reformation and in particular of Martin Luther, William Tyndale, Thomas Cranmer and Thomas Cromwell.

More coined the word “utopia” – a name he gave to the ideal, imaginary sland nation whose political system he described in Utopia, published in 1516. He opposed the king’s separation from the papal church and denied that the king was the Supreme Head of the Church of England, a status the king had been given by a compliant parliament through the Act of Supremacy of 1534. He was imprisoned in the Tower of London in 1534 for his refusal to take the oath required by the First Succession Act, because the act disparaged the power of the Pope and Henry’s marriage to Catherine of Aragon. In 1535 he was tried for treason and beheaded. More was beatified by the Catholic Church in 1886 and canonized, with John Fisher, in 1935. In 1980, he was added to the Church of England’s list of ‘saints and heroes of the Christian Church’.

Published during More’s life:

• A Merry Jest
• Utopia
• Latin Poems
• Letter to Brixius
• Responsio ad Lutherum
• A Dialogue Concerning Heresies
• Supplication of Souls
• Letter Against Frith
• The Confutation of Tyndale’s Answer
• Apology
• Debellation of Salem and Bizance
• The Answer to a Poisoned Book

Utopia is placed in the New World and More links Raphael’s travels in with Amerigo Vespucci’s real life voyages of discovery. He suggests that Raphael is one of the 24 men Vespucci, in his Four Voyages of 1507, says he left for six months at Cabo Frio, Brazil. Raphael then travels further and finds the island of Utopia, where he spends five years observing the customs of the natives.

According to More, the island of Utopia is “…two hundred miles across in the middle part, where it is widest, and nowhere much narrower than this except towards the two ends, where it gradually tapers. These ends, curved round as if completing a circle five hundred miles in circumference, make the island crescent-shaped, like a new moon.

The island was originally a peninsula but a 15-mile wide channel was dug by the community’s founder King Utopos to separate it from the mainland. The island contains 54 towns, each with about 6000 households. The capital city, Amaurot, is located directly in the middle of the crescent island. Thirty households are grouped together and controlled by a Syphograntus (“Styward”), and a Traniborus (“Bencheater”) oversees 10 Stywards. Each town has a mayor elected from among the ranks of the Bencheaters. Every household has between 10 and 16 adults and people are re-distributed around the households and towns to keep numbers even. If the island suffers from overpopulation, colonies are set up on the mainland. Alternatively, the natives of the mainland are invited to be part of these Utopian colonies, but if they dislike it and no longer wish to stay, they may return. In the case of underpopulation the colonists are re-called.

There is no private ownership on Utopia, with goods being stored in warehouses and people requesting what they need. There are also no locks on the doors of the houses, which are rotated between the citizens every ten years. Agriculture is the most important job on the island. Every person is taught it and must live in the countryside, farming, for two years at a time, with women doing the same work as men. Parallel to this, every citizen must learn at least one of the other essential trades: weaving (mainly done by the women), carpentry, metalsmithing and masonry. There is deliberate simplicity about these trades; for instance, all people wear the same types of simple clothes and there are no dressmakers making fine apparel. All able-bodied citizens must work; thus unemployment is eradicated, and the length of the working day can be minimized: the people only have to work six hours a day (although many willingly work for longer). More does allow scholars in his society to become the ruling officials or priests, people picked during their primary education for their ability to learn. All other citizens are however encouraged to apply themselves to learning in their leisure time.

Slavery is a feature of Utopian life and it is reported that every household has two slaves. The slaves are either from other countries or are the Utopian criminals. These criminals are weighed down with chains made out of gold. The gold is part of the community wealth of the country, and fettering criminals with it or using it for shameful things like chamber pots gives the citizens a healthy dislike of it. It also makes it difficult to steal as it is in plain view. The wealth, though, is of little importance and is only good for buying commodities from foreign nations or bribing these nations to fight each other. Slaves are periodically released for good behavior.

Other significant innovations of Utopia include: a welfare state with free hospitals, euthanasia permissible by the state, priests being allowed to marry, divorce permitted, premarital sex punished by a lifetime of enforced celibacy and adultery being punished by enslavement. Meals are taken in community dining halls and the job of feeding the population is given to a different household in turn. Although all are fed the same, Raphael explains that the old and the administrators are given the best of the food. Travel on the island is only permitted with an internal passport and anyone found without a passport they are, on a first occasion, returned in disgrace, but after a second offence, they are placed into slavery. In addition, there are no lawyers and the law is made deliberately simple, as all should understand it and not leave people in any doubt of what is right and wrong.

There are several religions on the island: moon-worshipers, sun-worshipers, planet-worshipers, ancestor-worshipers and monotheists, but each is tolerant of the others. Only atheists are despised (but allowed) in Utopia, as they are seen as representing a danger to the state: since they do not believe in any punishment or reward after this life, they have no reason to share the communistic life of Utopia, and will break the laws for their own gain. They are not banished but encouraged to talk out their erroneous beliefs with the priests until they are convinced of their wrong. Raphael says that through his teachings Christianity was beginning to take hold in Utopia. The toleration of all other religious ideas is enshrined in a universal prayer all the Utopians recite. “…but, if they are mistaken, and if there is either a better government, or a religion more acceptable to God, they implore His goodness to let them know it.”

Wives are subject to their husbands and husbands are subject to their wives although women are restricted to conducting household tasks for the most part. Only few widowed women become priests. While all are trained in military arts, women confess their sins to their husbands once a month. Gambling, hunting, makeup and astrology are all discouraged in Utopia. The role allocated to women in Utopia might, however, have been seen as being more liberal from a contemporary point of view.

In my opinion: one of the most troublesome questions about Utopia is Thomas More’s reason for writing it. Some of the ideas in it, such as the ease of divorce, euthanasia and both married priests and female priests, seem to be polar opposites of his beliefs and those expected of the devout Catholic that he was. The concept of religious toleration seems to jar particularly with the information we have about him as Lord Chancellor: that he was a keen opponent of Protestants who would later kill him. Similarly, the criticism of lawyers comes from a writer who, as Lord Chancellor, was arguably the most influential lawyer in England.

In addition, the communistic life style of a Utopian shows the value that More placed on a simpler communal life, reflecting his longing for monastic duties. This in obvious juxtaposition to his city life in London. However, some see it as reflecting his pride in public service and working for a common cause.

Utopia is often seen as a satire and there are many jokes and satirical asides such as how honest people are in Europe, but these are usually contrasted with the simple, uncomplicated society of the Utopians.

The second option is that More agreed with the ideas he was propounding. The method of making a story about an imaginary place told by an imaginary man has the effect of distancing More from his radical political thoughts. Apart from Utopia meaning “Noplace” several other lands are mentioned: Achora meaning “Nolandia”, Polyleritae meaning “Muchnonsense”, Macarenses meaning “Happiland” and the river Anydrus meaning “Nowater”. These names are designed to emphasize the illusory nature of the work and Raphael’s last name, Hythlodaeus meaning “dispenser of nonsense” helps to discredit his words among those who get the joke.

The name Raphael, though, may have been chosen by More to remind his readers of the archangel Raphael who is mentioned in the Book of Tobit. In that book the angel guides Tobias and later cures his father of his blindness. While Hythloday may suggest his words are not to be trusted, Raphael meaning “God has healed”, suggests that Raphael may be opening the eyes of the reader to what is true. The suggestion that More may have agreed with the views of Raphael is given weight by the way he dressed; with “his cloak was hanging carelessly about him”; a style which Roger Ascham reports that More himself was wont to adopt. Furthermore, more recent criticism has questioned the reliability of both Gile’s annotations and the character of “More” in the text itself. Claims that the book only subverts Utopia and Hythloday are possibly oversimplistic.

Social Utopias of Reformation Epoch – Part 1

Social Utopias of Reformation Epoch – Part 2

Social Utopias of Reformation Epoch – Part 3

 

Introduction

I turned to the topic, because the theme of social utopias and hopes for a better life, a fair and honest government, social equality and the lack of class system since ancient times occupied the greatest thinkers of many different civilizations. On the very places that are not and can not be spoken in ancient China, this theme developed by Plato, but creating the very model of a perfect (in the author’s view) the state, albeit without specifying the pathways of this place in the real world certainly is a tribute to Thomas More and Tommaso Campanella, who wrote “Utopia” and “Sun City”, which made the names of their authors immortal.

Whatever you say, in the Middle Ages, life was bad and boring, if not more. Any benefits of civilization, destruction, filth, deceit, ignorance, lack of decent medicine – thousands of people dying from epidemics. In addition to all had no equity and no freedom. Supreme Ruler disposed of other people’s lives, both wanted to punish anyone. It was then and appears in the literature of this genre, as a utopian novel. Simply speaking, educated people (who managed to deal with pen and paper, if such there were few) have written stories about imaginary countries where there were no all the horrors that surrounded them. They describe a society without flaws and injustice, where all were equal and identical.

Despite the impossibility of creating such societies, books, Mora and Campanella, there are a number of ideas that were quite advanced for their time and who (though not all) are implemented in the modern world.

Figures of the Renaissance formulate new perspectives on social life. Biblical stories about the paradise of Adam and Eve, the life of Jews in the Promised Land, the teachings of St. Augustine (Aurelius) on the church as the kingdom of God on earth is untenable. Figures of the Renaissance attempted to portray the right person to the society without mentioning the Bible or the teachings of the holy fathers. For them, the figures of the Renaissance, the society – is necessary environment of human life. It is not in heaven, not a gift from God, but on the ground and the result of human effort. In their view, society, firstly, should take into account human nature, and secondly – for all people, and thirdly – a society of the distant future. The greatest influence on the history of philosophical thought and the historical fate of European nations had the teachings of Renaissance figures on the state system. That is their doctrine of the monarchy and the communist system. The first of these was the ideological basis of the established later absolutism, and the second – helped to create various communist theories, including Marxist communism.

Tommaso Campanella (1568 – 1639). Biography

Born in Stignano (in the county of Stilo) in the province of Reggio di Calabria in southern Italy, Campanella was a child prodigy. Son of a poor and illiterate cobbler, he entered the Dominican Order before the age of fifteen, taking the name of fra’ Tommaso in honour of Thomas Aquinas. He studied theology and philosophy with several masters.

Early on, he became disenchanted with the Aristotelian orthodoxy and attracted by the empiricism of Bernardino Telesio (1509–1588), who taught that knowledge is sensation and that all things in nature possess sensation. Campanella wrote his first work, Philosophia sensibus demonstrata (“Philosophy demonstrated by the senses”), published in 1592, in defense of Telesio.

In Naples, he was also initiated in astrology; astrological speculations would become a constant feature in his writings.

Campanella’s heterodox views, especially his opposition to the authority of Aristotle, brought him into conflict with the ecclesiastical authorities. Denounced to the Inquisition and cited before the Holy Office in Rome, he was confined in a convent until 1597.

After his liberation, Campanella returned to Calabria, where he was accused of leading a conspiracy against the Spanish rule in his hometown of Stilo. Campanella’s aim was to establish a society based on the community of goods and wives, for on the basis of the prophecies of Joachim of Fiore and his own astrological observations, he foresaw the advent of the Age of the Spirit in the year 1600. Betrayed by two of his fellow conspirators, he was captured and incarcerated in Naples, where he was tortured on the rack. He made a full confession and would have been put to death if he had not feigned madness and set his cell on fire. He was tortured further (a total of seven times) and then, crippled and ill, was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Campanella spent twenty-seven years imprisoned in Naples, often in the worst conditions. During his detention, he wrote his most important works: The Monarchy of Spain (1600), Political Aphorisms (1601), Atheismus triumphatus (Atheism Conquered, 1605–1607), Quod reminiscetur (1606), Metaphysica (1609–1623), Theologia (1613–1624), and his most famous work, The City of the Sun (originally written in Italian in 1602; published in Latin in Frankfurt (1623) and later in Paris (1638)). He even intervened in the first trial against Galileo Galilei with his courageous The Defense of Galileo (written in 1616, published in 1622). Ironically, Galileo himself probably would not have wanted Campanella’s assistance because of Campanella’s sometimes outlandish ideas and prior conviction of heresy.

Campanella was finally released from his prison in 1626, through Pope Urban VIII, who personally interceded on his behalf with Philip IV of Spain. Taken to Rome and held for a time by the Holy Office, Campanella was restored to full liberty in 1629. He lived for five years in Rome, where he was Urban’s advisor in astrological matters.

In 1634, however, a new conspiracy in Calabria, led by one of his followers, threatened fresh troubles. With the aid of Cardinal Barberini and the French Ambassador de Noailles, he fled to France, where he was received at the court of Louis XIII with marked favour. Protected by Cardinal Richelieu and granted a liberal pension by the king, he spent the rest of his days in the convent of Saint-Honoré in Paris. His last work was a poem celebrating the birth of the future Louis XIV (Ecloga in portentosam Delphini nativitatem).

Besides some minor philosophical works he wrote immortalized his work “Sun City” (Civitas Solis). The title of his work, he hid the criticism hyped Ages writings of St. Augustine “The City of God” (De Civitate Dei). In the city of the sun, the inhabitants of which Campanella called tanning beds, abolished private property, labor – total service and the most important human need, it “has no place scoundrels and parasites.” All sunroom “take part in military affairs, agriculture and ranching … And someone who knows more and more arts and crafts, and enjoyed great honors, to engage in the same order, or otherwise determined by the skill of those who turns to him most capable. The most serious crafts … are they and most commendable, and no one deviates from taking them … less severe crafts by women. ” “At home, bedrooms, beds and everything you need – they share.” Monk Campanella wrote that the sunroom on childbearing is regarded as a religious matter, sent for the good of the state, not individuals. “Couples the same for the reproduction of the population chooses the state itself. All power in the City of the Sun is in the hands of spiritual aristocracy, headed by the wisest philosopher, a kind of high priest,” which in our language we would call the Metaphysics…

In my opinion, ‘City of the Sun’ is not ideal, since it is not possible to get people engaged in farming and herding and military affairs, work more efficiently when there is its separation. The best results society is achieved when each person finds his place in society may be useful to him and does what he do best. As the marriage without love, but in the name of the state will not make a happy citizen, I think on this can deprive the rulers.

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 1

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 2

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 3

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 4

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 5

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 6

 

Misrecognition and Concealment in Ideology

While the above discussions indicate a progressive abandonment of functionalist tendencies and class reductionism, the discussion of misrecognition and concealment defines ideology in ways that bring it closer to pre-Althusserian positions.

The importance of concealment in ideology becomes increasingly salient once reproduction is no longer considered to function automatically.

According to Althusser, misrecognition of real relations is guaranteed not because the dominant class conceals them but because real relations cannot be recognized within ideology. Ideology adequately represents lived experience and adequately inserts subjects into their practical activities. It is false not in its portrayal of surface appearances but in that it only portrays surface appearances and not the underlying structural relations which inform them. In other words, ideology is false in that it is not science. This is Althusser’s theoretical development of Lenin’s famous diction “that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade union consciousness;” socialist consciousness “would have to be brought to them from without” (Lenin, 1970:143).

If one allows that ideological subjection qualifies a subject to creatively act and produce counter-hegemonic ideologies, then not all ideological subjection “conceals” in the sense of causing misrecognition of relations of domination/subjugation. The question becomes whether ideological subjection-qualification, which does not reproduce the existing relations of domination (or is simply irrelevant to it) should be considered ideology at all. Urry (1982) defines ideology by its effects of concealment and labels other signifying practices that do not have these effects as merely practices in civil society. Laclau (1982:98) refers to practices that do not entail misrecognition as discursive practices. It is not clear what meaning he gives to misrecognition, but it appears to imply a more restricted definition of ideology.

Poulantzas’ (1973) distinction between ideology in general and specific class ideologies may help disentangle the notions of concealment and misrecognition. He considers ideology in general to be equivalent to culture (minus the term’s humanistic or functionalist connotations). Ideology as a general concept necessarily contains both real and false-known edge as a consequence of its limited horizon. In accord with Althusser, this limitation necessarily involves simultaneous recognition/misrecognition, and, thus, ideology is inherently “false” in contrast to science. Concealment in the traditional sense of obscuring relations of domination/subjugation (as emphasized by Urry, 1982) consists of the exorbitant effects of bourgeois ideology on the dominant ideology. As a result, subordinate class members are unable to clearly perceive their situation from their own vantage point and, thus, are unable to formulate their own class-specific ideology. Therborn also points out that the dominant class has a greater ability to organize experience and to structure the material matrix of affirmations and sanctions, which help maintain biases within the dominant ideology. An adequate conceptualization of ideology must allow the possibility of counter-hegemonic ideologies, which perform the function of unmasking relations of domination/subjugation. This is not to claim that counter-hegemonic ideologies necessarily provide scientific knowledge of the underlying structures that support these relations. However, counter-hegemonic ideologies, which are informed by scientific knowledge, should achieve a greater long-term measure of success.

The debate regarding misrecognition and concealment has important implications for the definition of ideology. Althusser and Poulantzas define ideology as (1) lived experience and (2) necessarily involving misrecognition. Their definition avoids the usage of ideology as only relatively coherent systems of meaning and, instead, includes all social practices and beliefs as ideological elements. It includes both the practices referred to by Laclau as “discursive,” as well as the practices Urry claims belong in civil society.

Ideology is too broadly defined by Althusser and Poulantzas and too narrowly defined by Urry. The former theorists see ideology as ubiquitous reproduction practices, which do not necessarily involve concealment, while the latter restricts ideology to practices which conceal the interests of particular social groups. The extent to which ideology conceals or reveals underlying relations of domination-subordination is a question for historical investigation and not part of the definition of ideology. We accept Laclau’s concept of the nonrandom articulation of beliefs and practices as the proper domain of ideology. This view leaves open the extent to which various ideologies actually conceal real social relations and also allows for the incorporation of Therborn’s concept of the material matrix of affirmations and sanctions that shapes (and is shaped by) ideological conflict in civil society.

Conclusion

In conclusion, our discussion of the new direction in Marxist theories of ideology suggests several amendments to the elaborated Althusserian theory we outlined earlier. We find that analysis of ideology would benefit from incorporation of at least six key concepts. We will briefly define each of these and provide an example of what issues we feel they illustrate. The concepts are:

1. The Subjection-Qualification Dialectic ( Therborn, 1980). Ideology subjects agents to the relations of exploitation, but in the process it qualifies people for creative action within their positions in society (including agents of social change and revolution). For example, while trade unions subject workers to the limits of an economistic perspective, in the process unions also qualify workers to act as a class.
2. Organic and Traditional Subjection-Qualification of Intellectuals (Gramsci, 1971). The role of intellectuals in struggles over hegemony is to elaborate on the horizon of knowledge and organize the corresponding affirmations and sanctions. There are two distinguishable types of intellectuals, organic and traditional; however, this distinction does not necessarily correspond to their position in ideological struggle. A current example of both organic and traditional intellectuals attempting to sustain a counter-hegemonic ideology is Lech Walensa and the KOR group in Poland. Many issues need to be addressed, e.g., what qualitative factors differentiate the constitution of organic and traditional intellectuals, and what distinguishes their relation to ideological struggle?
3. The Modes of Ideological Interpellation (Therborn, 1980). Ideologies have successive levels of interpellation which conform to the three views of what exists, what is good, and what is possible (and their negation — what does not exist, what is evil, what is impossible). For example, bourgeois concepts of human nature posit that only selfish people exist, that the pursuit of self-interest is good, and that a communal system is not possible.
4. The Dual Character of Ideology (Therborn, 1980). Each ideological expression has its supporting inverse. Thus, an ideology contains simultaneously ego and alter representations. Racism for example contains both an ego ideology of “white supremacy” and an alter ideology of black inferiority.
5. The People and Popular-Democratic Struggles (Laclau, 1977a). The expression of the interests of the power-bloc in the state organizes the interests of those outside the power-bloc into a non-class configuration of “the people.” “The people” struggle against the power-bloc for representation of their interests in the state. Therefore, these struggles are “popular” (of the people) and “democratic” (extend representation to the masses). Since “the people” includes all groups outside the power bloc, “popular-democratic” struggles may include ideological expressions that are anti-working class. For example, fascism can be a “popular-democratic” ideology of the petty-bourgeoisie outside of an alliance with the power-bloc.
6. Civil Society (Urry, 1982). Civil society is the space in which agents are constituted as subjects and subjects function to reproduce the material conditions of their lives. Capitalist production specifies that surplus value is realized and labor-power is reproduced in spheres outside of production. This does not function automatically; surplus value distribution and the reproduction of labor-power are issues of struggle. For example, the primary unit of reproduction is the family whose structure is neither a function of capitalist production nor the state. A central conflict within the family is over the distribution of labor in production of the use-values necessary for reproduction.

The foregoing list of useful concepts represents the beginning of the development of Marxist theories of ideology. Although a great deal of progress has been made since the orthodox relegation of ideology to the epiphenomenal superstructure and Althusser’s early functionalism, there are still many important issues unresolved and many important questions yet to be addressed. We hope that in summarizing and constructively criticizing recent Marxist theoretical work on ideology, we have helped to lay the foundation for the future theoretical elaboration and historical application of these important concepts.

Notes

The original version of this article appeared in The Insurgent Sociologist 13:4 (Summer, 1986), pp. 5–22.

1. Althusser’s reference to the ideological, economic, and political instances in his method for recognizing Marxism as a unique synthesis of German philosophy, English economics, and French politics. Marx constructed this synthesis as the continuation and simultaneous surpassing of the previous worldviews. It is a unique synthesis such that regardless of which instance one is examining at the time, all three are present in a formative or preparatory sense (see Gramsci, 1971:399– 401; Lenin, 1943:3– 9).
2. A full consideration of the issues raised by Althusser’s notion of Ideological State Apparatuses would involve an examination of the interface between the ideological instance and the state, which is beyond the scope of thin paper. Furthermore, Therborn (1980), Urry (1982), and even Althusser himself (1976) have pointed to the limitations and distortions in this concept. For these reasons, we will not provide any extensive discussion of Ideological State Apparatuses in this essay.
3. The reference to the unconscious is more than just an analogy. As Althusser points out (1969) “ideology has very little to do with ‘consciousness’. It is profoundly unconscious.” One of Althusser’s important contributions has been to integrate psychoanalysis into a Marxist problematic. It is important to realize that for Althusser a complete Marxist theory of ideology requires this structuralism social psychology.
4. As Burawoy (1979) has shown, the function of reproduction also takes place within the economic base, but this is not Althusser’s concern.
5. Althusser does not provide examples of the Subject-subject relation in these other regions even though he argues that the education-family couplet has replaced the religion-family couplet as the dominant ISAs in capitalist societies. It is unclear to us exactly how subjection operates in these regions, as there are two possible interpretations. For example, in the region of education the student exists in a relation of dominance-subjection with the teacher, Teacher-student, but also each student in subjected to the concept of student, Student-student.
6. See also Anderson’s (1977) discussion of the influence of one of Gramsci’s conceptions of the exercise of hegemony by the state apparatus on Althusser’s concept of Ideological State Apparatuses.
7. Poulantzas states that only the two major classes of a given social formation have relatively coherent ideologies. Secondary classes are characterized by ideological subensembles which eclectically spin together ideological elements from the major class ideologies.
8. Scientific discourse does allow for contradictions, which exist in social relations. It is in this sense that ideology in false, not in the sense of false consciousness.
9. Poulantzas (1973:211) claims that “technocratism” has become the articulating region under monopoly capitalism. However, he does not develop this point. It is interesting to note that Bahro (1978) claims that in “actually existing socialist countries” the political bureaucracy is the dominant instance of the mode of production and technocracy is the articulating region of the dominant ideology. Technocracy in so employed as to justify and legitimate the bureaucratic hierarchy.
10. This calls into question the notion that the working class must be the “vanguard” in any transition to socialism.
11. See Poulantzas (1973) on the concept of the “power bloc.”
12. Basically, a reductionist theory does not allow for the relative autonomy of the political and the ideological from the economic level. Each political or ideological practice of significance is conceived of as having a direct economic cause or reflecting the economic interests of a class. Instrumentalism in political theory and economics in general tend to be reductionist theories (see Gramsci, 1971:158– 168 for a discussion of economics). An autonomous theory in conceptually the opposite of a reductionist theory. Politics and ideologies are affected by the economy (and vice versa), but there is no determination in the last instance of the economic. Autonomous theories generally stem from Weberian influences. Since civil society is tied to the advent of capitalism, it is a historically specific concept. Althusser’s theory of mode of production having three instances is an abstract conception without a “history.”
13. According to Therborn (1980:85, 133, note 36) in a personal communication, Althusser stated he is no longer defending ISAs as such, only the intrinsic link between ideological apparatuses and the state. This latter conception seems consistent with Urry’s theory of the role of the law, although he rejects the centrality Althusser (1971) and Poulantzas (1973) give to the juridical-political ideology.
14. The absence of an analysis of how class struggle affects the ideological constitution of subjects and thus the reproduction of society is a striking deficiency in Althusser’s work noted by Hirst (1976) and even Althusser himself (1976).
15. We should note that Poulantzas’ (1973. 210–216) discussion of the various regions within the ideological instance is not class reductionist. He argues that the various regions are structured by class domination but cannot be reduced to class interests. However, this one example does not refute the argument that many components of his theory suffer from class reductionism.

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 1

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 2

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 3

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 4

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 5

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 6

 

Ideological Struggle and the Unity of Ideology

Since civil society is separate from production, it may contain modes of subjection which do not necessarily reproduce production and may even be contrary to its reproduction, at least in the short run (1982:119– 123). Reproduction is therefore not predetermined but instead a matter of struggle. Moreover, civil society contains various institutions—family, market, church, schools, etc. Thus, struggles over reproduction cannot be reduced to class struggles.

Urry claims that Althusser’s theory of ideology suffers from an inertfunctionalism since it implies that reproduction is “automatic” and “so structured that it is the most functionally appropriate for social relations of capitalist production” (1982:52). Like Therborn and Laclau, he notes that struggles over reproduction of labor-power (class struggle) and struggle over reproduction of the power-bloc (popular-democratic struggle) is absent from Althusser’s theory. According to Urry, the notion of the ideological instance does not include a well-defined arena for struggle over reproduction. The concept of civil society provides this arena. Given ideology does not automatically reproduce capitalist relations but instead consists of disparate practices which may or may not reproduce production (or may simply be irrelevant to it), then there is also no basis for assuming a unified ideological instance. Urry contends that the material practices, which interpolate subjects, should be conceived as practices in civil society and nothing more. There is no dominant ideology since “class practices may or may not overlap with that of other classes. There may or may not be relations of domination between different class practices” (1982:47). Urry even goes on to argue that class practices (such as “interest, ritual, know-how, symbols and illusions, modes of thought, and views of life”) have no inherent unity and therefore should not be considered class ideologies at all (1982:47). As a result, he claims there is no ideological instance, only ideological effects. A social practice has an ideological effect only when there is “a concealment of causes, nature and consequences of that practice and this concealment is in the interests of one or more of the dominant social forces” (1982:45). Urry has thus restricted the concept of ideology to a distinct and more orthodox meaning.

It is our position that his assertion that class practices “may or may not overlap” and “may or may not be relations of domination” does not invalidate the existence of a unified pattern of ideological hegemony. As Gramsci (1971:161) states, “the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised.” Therefore, we would expect the dominant ideology to include overlapping practices and relations of compromise. Urry’s conception of civil society represents an advance over Althusser’s ideological instance in that conflict and struggle are made more central, but Urry’s theory is not without difficulties. His position regarding the separation of production from struggles over reproduction in civil society is a decisive step in avoiding reductionism (see Giddens, 1982 for a different argument with similar conclusions). However, struggle in production does not have a clear conceptual location in Urry’s theory. Since class struggle in production is not examined, the determinant effects of production on circulation and reproduction are underspecified. Urry claims that ideology is everywhere (1982:31); we claim the same is true of struggle.

 

Discussion

Recent Marxist theories of ideology have moved in three major directions since the theoretical conjuncture opened up by Althusser. These three directions are (1) a movement away from functionalist theories of reproduction and towards an analysis of qualified actors, (2) a critique of class reductionism and emphasis on non-class struggles, and (3) a reconceptualization of the meaning of misrecognition and the importance of concealment in defining ideology and a move toward a more restrictive definition of ideology.

Functionalism

All of the recent theories incorporate Althusser’s fundamental premise that the constitution of subjects always takes place within ideology and that there is no inherent essence to class subjects outside of, or prior to ideology. However, they all break to relative degrees within his position that ideology necessarily functions to reproduce the relations of production. The problems with this position are most evident in Althusser’s concept of “subjection-guarantee.” If ideology reproduces the relations of production through subjecting all subjects and guaranteeing to them that everything is as it seems, then there is no place for ideological struggle. To be sure, Althusser makes no such assertion, but he leaves no mechanism in his analysis for non-reproduction. Therborn’s (1980) concept of subjection qualification provides such a mechanism. It retains the premise of ideological subjection but indicates that subjection qualifies one to act and thus subjection and reproduction may not necessarily correspond.

To a larger extent, the functionalist tendencies in Althusser are the result of the limits imposed by his object of study. By choosing “ideology in general” as his object of study, Althusser was not able to address conflicts between particular ideologies. In examining particular ideologies, each of the subsequent authors found it necessary to move in the direction of including class struggle and historical contingency in their analysis. Poulantzas (1973) argues that the dominant ideology is a result of ideological class struggle, and Laclau (1977a) emphasizes the importance of subjection to counter-hegemonic ideologies. Urry (1982) speaks to the notion of the unity of ideology. Since Althusser’s (1971) assertion of unity is based on the function of ideology as reproduction, to acknowledge that ideology contains non-reproductive practices then destroys the basis of that unity. Instead, unity must come from other sources, such as the nation-state, as Poulantzas (1973) suggests.

Each of these theorists argue that ideological subjection results from ideological struggle and does not automatically reproduce existing social relations. Ideological dominance is contingent on successful elaboration and organization of the dominant ideology as well as cooptation or containment of opposing ideologies. This makes the role of intellectuals central to understanding ideology and ideological conflict. A significant lacuna in all of the theories (with the partial exception of Poulantzas, 1973 and 1980) is an adequate analysis of the specific role of intellectuals. One can find the beginnings of a theory of intellectuals in Gramsci’s (1971:5–23) brilliant discussion of the role of traditional and organic intellectuals. He realized that intellectuals have a significant and relatively autonomous position in the social structure and that their relation to class forces is a significant determinant of the outcome of ideological conflict. The theory of ideology needs to more fully address the role of intellectuals in the production of ideology and the processes by which it becomes transformed.

Reductionism

The second direction taken by recent Marxist theories is the progressive abandonment of both economic reductionism and class reductionism. Stalinist Marxism is reductionist in both senses, viewing the superstructure as a reflection of the economic base and ideologies as reflections of the economic interests of particular social classes. Althusser (1971) and Poulantzas (1973) break with economic reductionism by positing the relative autonomy of the ideological and political levels of social formations. Yet both retain class reductionist definitions of ideology. For Althusser ideology reproduces class domination while for Poulantzas all ideological elements have a specific class character (1974). Therborn (1980) and Laclau (1977a) deny that all ideologies can be reduced to class interests but argue that all ideologies are overdetermined by class ideologies. This is only a partial break with class reductionism.

Urry (1982) and Laclau, in a later discussion (1982), deny the necessary primacy of class ideologies over non-class ideologies in conflicts over hegemony. According to Urry (1982), there are many different ideological struggles within civil society, and it is a contingent question as to whether class or non-class ideological conflicts will be more important in any particular social formation. Laclau (1982:100) argues along similar lines that either class or non-class articulating principles may form the basis of hegemony.

In part, these positions are missing one another. The differences between these theorists partially reflect differences in their units of analysis. Althusser (1971) is exclusively concerned with the reproduction of the relations of production, whereas Laclau (1982) and Urry (1982) are concerned with the reproduction of the social formation. Political hegemony cannot be reduced to class hegemony. Attempts to do so obscure the specific nature of race, sex, national, religious, and other non-class struggles. This does not mean that the mode of production does not structure social relations in a social formation but only that not all social relations can be reduced to relations of production.

Victorian as a cultural phenomenon associated with the long reign of Queen Victoria (1837-1901), but its value for the subsequent development of English history, culture, literature cannot be overestimated. It was during this Victorian period literature in England acquires the status of a great colonial power, forms the national idea and identity, which was destined to challenge the aggressive attacks from the outside.

Victorian left in the minds of the English people some idea of the inviolability of traditions, significance of democracy and moral philosophy, as well as a strong desire to turn to time-tested emblems and symbols of the Victorian era. In fact, it was the Victorians it’s great literature proved the enduring importance of spiritual values in the formation of the national mentality and determination of the place of the individual in history and civilization. In the works of Victorian authors: Charles Dickens and W. M. Thackeray, Bronte sisters, E. Gaskell, D. Meredith, George. Eliot, Trollope reflected particular social and political development of England, with all the complexities and contradictions, discoveries and failures.

Long time Victorian England was preserved in the everyday understanding of the English as a symbol of uncompromising prosperity, sustainability and stability in the whole of the human being and of society as a whole. This is a society of the era of the reign of Victoria in the novel George. After Victoria’s death, as I believe along with the author of the heroes of Galsworthy, the period of smartnote, instability, the collapse of values.

Victorian Era literature themes

The Victorian boom in the literature of the 50-60-ies of XX century confirmed this view, but it happened at a time when England itself was found with difficulties associated with the rise of the middle class, which was a stronghold of Victorian. Quite a different picture we see in the postmodern English novel, who rediscovered his countrymen the so-called Victorian values, until recently, considered beyond review and reassessment. D. Fowles and A. Biett saw almost a century later, what was contained and suppressed Victorian England, intoxicated with the success of the economic and international, humanitarian and cultural.

Again in the minds of modern Englishmen arose the ghosts of the past prosperity reflected in a kind of eclectic Victorian architecture and sculpture, the literature that contains enormous potential destructive power. Monument to Queen Victoria at Buckingham Palace, Victorian mansions, spacious and solidly built, but quite ridiculous in its versatility and designed for a large staff of servants, and the Museum of Albert and Victoria are perceived now as symbols and emblems of the past century, but also as silent witnesses of the unclaimed are still ideas about the real Victoria and her era.

National identity as a set of peculiarities of the national ideas, mentality and relations with society, historical category, agile and dynamic, it can not exist as once and for all fixed for a certain time. In this case, following Jacques Derrida, we can read texts in several historical eras, which does not contradict the idea of national identity, the prospects inherent in the dialectic of development. For national identity is an important context, in this case Victorian culture, so you should recall three important aspects of the crumbling old, the modern state and the emerging new, declaring themselves not quite systematically and persistently.

Crumbling old concluded, on the one hand, the final break with the genre of romance and an appeal to modern life. That’s why for the Victorians it is very important to determine their attitude to the eighteenth century when the confrontation between the two genre categories ended in victory for the novel.

Literature elements

The eighteenth century with its huge reliance on the mind and feeling as an equal category of human consciousness was especially close to a pragmatic and dynamic nineteenth century. Education and training, to which so much attention was paid to the enlightenment, became a special concern of the Victorian writer. Education and awareness formed a large readership, which in the Victorian time. Specialization took place, mainly by attracting the child audience as a mass reader and grateful. In the XIX century. In England, was born literature for boys and girls.

On the other hand, the crumbling old had potential, not shown in full extent in the age of the flowering of the novel. Therefore, it was important that destroying the old to usher in a new relationship with the other two aspects of culture. Modern current state of the novel in the Victorian era was determined by its dominant position in society, as the most adequate and complete reflection of the panorama of life, however, the notion of genre has changed due to the fact that art is farther away from the category of imitation, the simulation, the position of the novel in the Victorian era were exceptionally favorable, the Queen herself was interested in the works of his contemporaries, the novel existed in cheap editions.

He was instrumental in the formation of public opinion in connection with the spread of education among the population. Language and terminology was clarified as the acquisition of novel status of the main generator of ideas on maintenance of stability and order in society. The classic formula of Fielding, or rather, his definition of genre as “comic epic poem in prose” is preserved in only the first of Dickens “Posthumous notes of the Pickwick club”, which coincided with his appearance with the accession of Victoria to the throne.

Later Dickens used different wording put forward by W. Collins, “make them laugh, cry, wait.” As a public nation, England made the novel part of the public-political life and of being a citizen who is concerned about not only their rights, but also responsibilities. English Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli was both a Victorian Era novelist and head of the literary political group – “Young England”. It was his most honored Queen. Indeed in his work reflected many of the features of English identity, perceived from the inside Victorian and outside it.

Queen Victoria (1819-1901) and her husband Prince Albert, was closely connected by family or dynastic ties with many European monarchs. Russian Tsar Alexander I was the godfather of Victoria, so it has a middle name Alexandrina in honor of Alexander. During the reign of Victoria, England became a major colonial power, and the Queen was proclaimed Empress of India. The success of a thriving industrial power was illustrated at the world exhibition in London in 1851.

However, the stability was relatively, more precisely, it has been maintained and strengthened at the expense of family, home, develop a specific doctrine of behavior and morality. Frequent change of governments (Melbourne, Palmerston, Gladstone, Disraeli, Salisbury) showed a change of priorities in foreign and domestic policy. Democratization was driven by a constant fear of the monarch to a possible threat from the revolutionary-minded neighbors (France, Germany, America, far), and the need to reduce the gap between higher and secondary layer English society.

The latter became a reliable bulwark of the nation and consistently achieved success towards the conquest of power. Chartism and his success also influenced the apparent stability, caused irritation and fear of the ruling circles. Chartism proved to be quite active in the 40’s and early 50-ies. Even the philosopher and ideologist of the Victorian Thomas Carlyle devoted a separate work to this labor movement, which had a significant impact on the internal politics of the UK.

Victorian writing style

At the same time with significant successes and achievements in the Victorian era, the contradictions and in England (the constant conflicts of London with the Parliament) and outside. Disagreements regarding interference in the internal Affairs of Portugal, in the years 1846-1847, the debate in connection with the policy of the foreign Minister in the Palmerston government of Lord Russell, even coming to England in 1864. Garibaldi greeted with enthusiasm by most of the British, renewed contacts with France, the exchange of state visits between Victoria and Napoleon III caused a mixed reaction in English society.

The Queen several times made the attempt. In 1854 he unleashed the Crimean war with Russia in support of Turkey. The pacifist policy of Prince Albert and his opposition to the policy of Palmerston made him a highly unpopular figure, had even been rumored that he is Russian spy and should be tried for treason. When the civil war began in America, England was on the side of the southerners. Palmerston and Russell saw an excuse to weaken the position of the United States, representing a threat to the international prestige of England. Only the personal intervention of Prince Albert saved two of the nation from an imminent war that could change the entire future course of history.

After her husband’s death Victoria was engaged exclusively in the Imperial Affairs of the nation. She truly resented the racist prejudices among his countrymen and condemned the attitude of the Boers to the black people of South Africa. Even getting the news about the failures of the British army in Africa, Victoria said: “In our house we are not interested in the possibilities of defeat they just don’t exist.” In these words was the essence of the Victorian ideology and politics, philosophy of life and morality.

The marriage of Victoria and Albert was very happy. He has served as a model and an example to his subjects. She had nine children. Family relations always constitute the standard of nobility and understanding, disagreements were of a purely political nature and were not fundamental.

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 1

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 2

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 3

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 4

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 5

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 6

 

The Material Matrix of Ideology

Therborn defines ideology as a discursive practice that is inscribed in a non-discursive material matrix of affirmations and sanctions. Discursive and non-discursive practices are always empirically intertwined; however, he argues that analytically separating the two is essential to an understanding of ideological conflict and transformation (1980:33). Any ideology disposes the actor to develop certain modes of thought and rationalities deriving from that ideology. Acting upon these rationalities will result in material consequences. The consequences of one’s actions are evaluated along the dimensions of whether they were advantageous or disadvantageous in comparison to an alternative set of beliefs. It is this material matrix, which determines the relative power of ideologies (1980:33–35).

The concept of a material matrix of affirmations and sanctions gives substance to the notion of the “materiality of ideology,” while avoiding Althusser’s radial claim that ideology is only material practices and not ideas. It also provides a framework for Althusser’s notion of “guarantee,” addressing the material conditions, which contribute or do not contribute to the achievement of this guarantee.

Therborn retains Althusser’s conception of ideology as lived experience but rejects the implication that experience of social relations is necessarily imaginary. Ideology for Therborn is not restricted to illusions and misrecognition. Therefore, he rejects the distinction between science and ideology (1980:4). He notes that the science-ideology dichotomy rests on the notion that an individual’s perception of one’s lived relations either corresponds (science) or does not correspond (ideology) to reality. Therborn criticizes this opposition between science and ideology as only echoing the traditional distinction between true and false consciousness. He claims these are a “utilitarian residue in Marxism, which should be rejected, explicitly and decisively, once and for all” (1980:5).

Therborn’s argument (1980:4–10) leads to a position we can characterize as “normative relativism.” He holds that it is an untenable assumption “that normative conceptions are given in the reality of existence and are accessible only through true knowledge of the latter” (1980:5). Instead, Therborn states that interests are constituted in and by ideology depending upon the material matrix of affirmations and sanctions. Consequently, all class interests are only subjective, there being no objective interests determined by real conditions, which lie beyond conscious recognition.

We consider Therborn’s point to be well taken, but it has two major shortcomings. First, he does not sufficiently specify the relation of the matrix of affirmations and sanctions to the “real” structurally determined positions of classes in production. Secondly, Therborn’s theory suffers from not incorporating Poulantzas’ conception of ideology as constituting the horizon of one’s experience. Because of this omission, he cannot explain how one’s lived experience does not provide adequate knowledge of the “real” social structural relations, such as classes and modes of production.

Although much of Therborn’s work on ideology suffers from his emphasis-abstract classification at the expense of detailed analysis, he has advanced the discussion of ideology in significant ways. His choice of taking particular ideologies and their interrelations as his object of analysis, as opposed to Althusser’s emphasis on “ideology in general,” has allowed him to theorize about ideological conflict and change. In denying the idea of real class interests, he also denies that ideology involves misrecognition. The concept of ideology, broadened in Althusser’s reconceptualization from false consciousness to recognition/misrecognition, is further broadened by Therborn’s conceptualization of it as definitions of reality, their normative evaluations, and the assessment of conceivable alternatives. A movement away from an exclusive emphasis on class ideologies also characterizes Therborn’s work. This tendency is taken further in the recent work of Laclau and Urry.

 

Laclau

The work of Ernesto Laclau (1977a, 1977b, 1982) epitomizes the transformations that have occurred in Marxist theories of ideology within the Althusserian framework. Laclau retains Althusser’s emphasis on the ideological interpellation of subjects as the unifying principle of ideology. However, he argues that the process of interpolating subjects through “hailing” does not always result in subjection to the existing social order but also characterizes anti-hegemonic ideologies. Laclau claims, for example (1977a:101), that hailing occurs in communist discourse, such as Marx’s famous finale to the Communist Manifesto: “Workers of all countries unite!” He criticizes Althusser for reducing all ideology to the dominant ideology by concentrating on “ideology in general.” Laclau is more concerned with how particular ideologies are created and transformed and with specifying the interrelations between these diverse subjectivities.

Laclau also broadens the referent of ideology (even more so than Therborn) to include non-class interpellations such as those which form the basis of popular-democratic struggles. These are struggles between the power-bloc and “the people” (all groups outside the political power bloc), as well as struggles against racial, sexual, and ethnic oppression. According to Laclau, this is a complete break with the class reductionism that characterized Althusser’s theory.

Ideological Articulation and Hegemony

For Laclau, the meaning of particular ideologies depends on their position within the totality of ideological discourse. Therefore, the most important feature of an analysis of ideology is an explanation of the non-arbitrary ways in which various ideologies are interrelated. In order to do this Laclau implements and elaborates Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. According to Laclau, “hegemony is not an external relation between preconstituted social agents, but the very process of discursive construction of those agents” (1982:100). This process of constructing social agents involves the unification of the diverse interpellations (gender, class, race, etc.) which characterize any individual by a “specific articulating principle.” This gives each of these interpellations a specific meaning in relation to all other interpellations. Hegemony is the imposition of an articulating principle upon an ensemble of social relations linking them together.

In his earlier works (1977a:108–109, 1977b:164) Laclau argues that this articulating principle must belong to a class defined by its position within the dominant mode of production in a social formation. More recently (1982:100), he has allowed for the possibility of non-class articulating principles becoming hegemonic. In doing so, Laclau stresses the importance for Marxist theory to incorporate the analysis of non-class subjection and struggle. He leaves open the question of ultimate class articulation to historical rather than functional analysis. This is a vast improvement over Poulantzas’ analysis of the “articulating region.”

The implications of Laclau’s discussion of hegemony is that ideological struggle cannot be viewed as a process of counterposing a pure Marxist-Leninist “working-class” ideology to the dominant “bourgeois” ideology. Instead, it involves (1) dislodging certain elements that have been articulated into the discourse of the dominant class (e.g., democracy) and (2) defining these elements in relation to a new articulating principle. We find Alan Wolfe’s (1977) analysis of the contradictions between liberalism and democracy is an example of the former, while Herbert Gintis’ (1980) discussion of the meaning of liberal democracy is a proposal to do the latter.

Laclau views the dominant contradiction in the social formation as that between “the people” and the power bloc (1977a108). Therefore, the outcome of ideological struggles between classes depends on the ability of each class to present itself as the authentic representative of “the people” (i.e., the “national interest”) (1977b:161). Through his reconceptualization of the nature of hegemony, Laclau is able to account for both the existence of many competing partial ideologies (pluralism) and the fact that the articulation of these ideologies in a specific manner is accomplished via struggle and the resulting hegemonic ideology.

 

Urry

Although Laclau rejects much of Althusser’s theory of ideology, he retains the definition of a social formation as consisting of three levels or instances: economic, political, and ideological. John Urry’s (1982) recent analysis of the structure of capitalist social formations abandons the classification for one that stresses the importance of Gramsci’s (1971) concept of civil society. Urry severely criticizes Althusser’s basic theory of the instances of a mode of production, particularly the concept of an ideological instance. Whereas Althusser (1971:129, 131; 1970:138, 178–179, 320) was attempting to rescue the base/superstructure analogy from its stagnant Stalinist interpretation, Urry is arguing that the “notions of base/superstructure, or of the economic/political/ideological, should be placed once-and-for-all in the dustbin of history” (1982:153). These notions lead to three crucial problems in Marxist theory: (1) the failure to recognize the importance of separating reproduction from production, (2) the improper conception of an ideological instance (or dominant ideology) as unified in the same sense as the state or production, and (3) the overextension of the state to include all ideological apparatuses. According to Urry, Althusser’s three relatively autonomous instances can be abandoned without falling back into economic reductionism. Capitalist social formations should instead be conceived of as comprising the state, production, and civil society. Urry claims that the concept of civil society avoids the problems associated with the ideological instance. We will review this concept and examine its implications for the theory of ideology.

Civil Society

Urry defines civil society as the “site where individual subjects reproduce their material conditions of life” (1982:6). It consists of three spheres — circulation, reproduction and struggle. Jointly these spheres comprise that set of social practices in which agents are constituted as subjects. Under capitalism, these spheres of civil society are separate from production (and the state). The separation of civil society from production derives from the fact that surplus labor takes a value form which creates “a separate realm of circulation in which surplus-value is realized, a sphere of exchange in which all commodities, including that of labor-power, are bought and sold” (1982:29). Furthermore, capitalist production and the state each have a distinct unity, based on the production of surplus value in the former and a monopoly of organized forces in the latter, but civil society has no such unity. Urry argues that Althusser’s concept of the ideological state apparatuses (ISAs) overextends the state, depriving it of its distinct nature and robbing theorists of an important conceptual tool. He suggests that much of what Althusser considers ISAs and most of what orthodox sociology is concerned with (such as relations of race, religion, gender, and generation) should be viewed as institutions and practices of civil society.

This does not mean that civil society is completely autonomous from production or the state. Production is connected to civil society through the circulation of capital and labor-power. The medium of this circulation is money. Likewise, the state is connected to civil society through the circulation of power and ideology. The medium of this circulation is the law (1982:115–116). The concept of the law operating as a medium between the state and civil society is an intriguing idea, but underdeveloped. Relations between the state and civil society outside of the law (such as illegal repression) have no place in Urry’s conception. Nor does he explain the role of lawyers and judges (the organic intellectuals of legal discourse) in popular-democratic struggles, a role which Poulantzas (1980) considers substantial.

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 1

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 2

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 3

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 4

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 5

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 6

 

Ideological Regions

In describing the dominant ideology of capitalist social formations, Poulantzas notes the particular importance of juridical-political relations. He states that the dominant ideology has a variety of ideological regions such as juridical-political, moral, aesthetic, religious, technocratic, and so on. The dominant ideology will be characterized by the dominance of one of these regions such that all other regions are articulated in relation to it. This “articulating region” will fall to the one which is best suited to mask the real relations of exploitation and therefore best serves the role of cohesion (1973:210–215). For capitalism, the juridical-political is the articulating region.

In his last book, Poulantzas (1980) discusses the role of the law in juridical-political ideology. He argues that the law “materializes the dominant ideology” (1980:83). It does so in such a way that social relations are mystified as individual relations. Since the law itself is unknowable to all but intellectuals of the state, the people become further mystified. As such, the law reproduces the division between intellectual and manual labor, condensing it in the state. In a particularly illuminating passage, Poulantzas points out that no one should be ignorant of the law — that is the fundamental maxim of the modern judicial system, in which no one but the state representatives are able to know the law. This knowledge required of every citizen is not even a special subject of study at school (1980:89–90).

Poulantzas’ argument that the juridical-political masks the real relations of dominance/subordination is convincing but is only a restatement of what has previously been pointed out by McPherson (1961) and others. What is less convincing is that the articulating region is necessarily that region which best serves to mask these relations. There is no internal mechanism in this schema, which explains how such a region becomes the articulating region, only that it will not correspond to the dominant instance of the social formation. Poulantzas’ argument is excessively functionalist, lacking class or historical contingencies despite the fact that he cites Weber’s historical analysis of the role of juridical-political ideology in the origins of capitalist formations (1973:212).

The articulation of ideological elements within the dominant ideology is a key issue, and, in our view, masking contradictions is not an adequate explanation. Juridical-political notions dominated the ideology of the rising bourgeoisie before the capitalist formation came into being. Thus, it could not have been functioning primarily to mask contradictions in this yet nonexistent social formation. The incipient juridical-political ideology of the rising bourgeoisie was aimed as much at exposing and destroying the dominant (i.e., political) instance of the feudal formation as it was at bringing about favorable conditions for a new social formation based on a capitalist mode of production. The articulating ideological region would appear to arise out of class struggle not structural determinism. Moreover, class struggle between competing dominant classes and class factions may be more important in determining the articulating region than struggle between the dominant and dominated classes (cf. Abercrombie and Turner, 1978).

We find the lack of historically contingent, causal arguments to be the central problem with the theory of ideology as elaborated by Althusser and Poulantzas. As a result the theory tends to lapse into explanations based upon stagnant functionalism or simple domination by capital and/or the state. We agree with Giddens (1981) who claims that under this approach human agents tend to appear “as ‘cultural dopes,’ not as actors who are highly knowledgeable about the institutions they produce and reproduce” (1981:18; see also 15–25, 42–47, 215–220). Of particular importance is the lack of an adequate analysis of ideological struggle as a causal factor in theory. This is especially true of Althusser, but even Poulantzas’ analysis of struggle (most evident in his later works) is plagued by severe limitations. In general, these limitations are the ultimate reduction of all struggle to class struggle and the placing of class struggle within the framework of the dominant ideology.

Before reviewing recent works which start with the insights of Althusser and Poulantzas, we will briefly outline the key elements of their theory (condensed from Poulantzas, 1973:199– 224; 1983:63–93).

1. Ideology consists of a relatively coherent ensemble of representations, values and beliefs. This ensemble reflects the relations of agents to the conditions in which they live in an imaginary form.
2. At the level of lived relations, ideology serves as the horizon of agent’s experience. Thus, ideology is necessarily false and inadequate for providing scientific knowledge.
3. Ideology is materialized in rituals, rules, styles, fashions — i.e., the way of life for a society. It is present in all activities and indistinguishable from once lived experience.
4. These material practices interpolate subjects to insert them into practical activities that support the social structure while the structure itself remains opaque.
5. At the level of a social formation, there are ideologies, which correspond to classes, and the dominant ideology, which is a product of class struggle. The dominant ideology typically will be most consistent with the ideology of the dominant class.
6. The unity of the dominant ideology reflects the unity of the social formation reconstituted on an imaginary plane. By presenting their lived experiences to subjects as part of a relatively contradiction-free coherent ensemble, the dominant ideology provides cohesion to the social formation.
7. The dominant ideology is characterized by an articulating region which best serves to conceal social contradictions. Under capitalism, this is the juridical political region. It is materialized in the law.

It is clear that Althusser and Poulantzas have overcome many of the shortcomings that have hindered Marxist theoretical development. The following theorists attempt to reconstruct this theory of ideology in such a way as to resolve some of the remaining shortcomings. To a notable degree, each work stresses the causal importance of human agency, no class ideologies, and multi-faceted struggles.

 

Recent Theoretical Developments: Therborn, Laclau, and Urry

Therborn

Goran Therborn, in The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology (1980), has both expanded upon and trenchantly criticized Althusser’s (1971) theoretical work on the structure and function of ideology. Although he locates his essay in a theoretical “conjuncture of Marxist discourse on ideology opened by Althusser” (1980:7), Therborn notes the necessity of “a break from the lingering restrictions of Althusser’s problematic” in order to facilitate “a shift or broadening of the object of inquiry from the role of ideology in the reproduction of exploitation and power to the generation, reproduction, and transformation of ideologies” (1980:10). Note that Therborn has shifted the object of study from both “ideologies in general” and the “dominant ideology” to particular ideologies and their interrelations. This theoretical departure allows Therborn to address conflict between ideologies and ideological transformations. This is accomplished by (1) introducing into the notion of interpellation the potential for conflict, (2) noting the material forces, which govern the relative power of competing ideologies, and (3) distinguishing between various dimensions of ideology and the manner in which these enter into ideological debate.

Therborn (1980) accepts the Althusserian emphasis on ideology as a process of interpolating subjects through largely unconscious psychodynamic processes (1980:2). He defines ideology as “that aspect of the human condition under which human beings live their lives as conscious actors in a world that makes sense to them to varying degrees” (1980:2). However, Therborn develops a very different sense of the duality of that process. He argues that Althusser’s couplet subjection-guarantee “allows no room for any dialectic of ideology” (1980:16) and should be replaced by “subjection-qualification” (1980:17).

Subjection-Qualification

For Althusser, the definition of a “subject” as an actor or creator of something is an imaginary relation that makes the real relation of subjection possible. Therborn argues that subjects really are creative actors in that ideology not only subjects them to relations of exploitation but also qualifies them to “take up and perform (a particular part of ) the repertoire of roles given in the society into which they are born, including the role of possible agents of social change” (1980:17, emphasis added). For example, although the educational process subjects students to a “hidden agenda” which serves to reproduce acquiescence to exploitative relations, it also qualifies students as agents of social change by providing them with the writing and analytical skills necessary for the development of counter-hegemonic ideologies.

Ideological conflict is generated by a lack of correspondence between subjection and qualification. This can happen in one of two ways. “New kinds of qualification may be required and provided, new skills that clash with the traditional forms of subjection. Or, conversely, new forms of subjection may develop that clash with the provision of still needed qualifications” (Therborn, 1980:17).

Therborn has improved upon Althusser’s static notion of subjection guarantee by allowing for change through the actions of “qualified” subjects. The potential for change corresponds to the degree of non-correspondence between the mechanisms of subjection and those of qualification.

Another important theoretical advance is Therborn’s conceptualization of the individual character of all ideologies. According to Therborn, each particular ideology includes a simultaneous definition of self and other, which he refers to as ego and alter ideologies, respectively. For example, Therborn refers to sexist ideology which requires both a positive definition of the male “ego” and a negative definition of the female “alter” Therefore, feminist ideological struggles entail a simultaneous redefinition of both alter and ego and, thus, potential conflict between men and women. Yet ideological struggles are never this clear-cut. Each individual subject consists of the articulation of multiple ego and alter ideologies. The crucial aspect of ideological struggle is the articulation of a given ideology with other ideologies.

The functioning of subjection-qualification involves three modes of ideological interpellation which correspond to the answers to three fundamental questions: (1) What exists?, (2) What is good?, and (3) What is possible? The answers to these questions provide “successive lines of defense of a given order” (1980:19). Therborn uses poverty to illustrate his point. First, the existence of poverty can be denied (or minimized). If this fails and the existence of poverty must be admitted, it can be argued that poverty is just since the poor are all inept or lazy and deserve no better. Third, if the existence and injustice of poverty must be admitted, it can be argued that a better social order is not possible or at least not under current conditions.

Therborn’s typology points out the limitations in other theories of ideology, which do not recognize the distinct ways these levels function. The traditional “liberal” approach to the study of ideology concentrates on “legitimation” and “consensus” or, in the above terms, on “what is good,” ignoring the fact that this question is premised on a certain definition of reality, that is, “what exists.” The traditional Marxist critique of “liberale” theory recognizes this problem and has been generally successful in reintroducing debate concerning the first question. Yet, Marxists have often intentionally de-emphasized the question of “what is possible?” due in part to the criticism of nonscientific Utopian Socialism found in Marx and Engels (1969:134–136). We feel this is a mistake and that Therborn has opened up an important arena of debate for a theory that is aimed at pressing beyond “liberal” reforms (for example, see Kiser, 1985; Kiser and Baker, 1984).

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 1

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 2

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 3

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 4

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 5

Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of Ideology – Part 6

 

The Materiality of Ideology

As a process rather than a system of ideas, ideology is given a material existence and can be studied as such. Ideology is material in that it consists of rituals, practices, and actions that constitute the process of interpellation. As such, ideology is ubiquitous. It serves to insert subjects into the practical activities of life according to the relations of the mode of production, thus reproducing those relations. According to Althusser, the state through Repressive State Apparatuses and Ideological State Apparatuses guarantee reproduction. The former function primarily by violence while the latter function primarily by ideology (1971:138). Included among the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) are the educational system, family, religion, trade unions, and communication systems. Of these, Althusser argues that education has become the most important for reproducing the relations of production and interrelating subjects.

Altogether, these ISAs are both the stake and the site of ideological class struggle (1971:140). By inference, RSAs should be the stake and site of political class struggle, though Althusser does not explicitly acknowledge this. An immediate problem with this conception is Althusser’s theory of the state. In this instance, he has essentially equated state and superstructure. We will examine the problem with this overextension of the state later (in the section on Urry).

Althusser’s theory of ideology departs substantially from previous Marxist treatments of ideology. The fact that ideology has a material existence means that it can no longer be viewed as an epiphenomenal reflection of the economic base. He also broadens the Marxist framework in such a way as to make ideology a central concept. This expansion enables him to incorporate many non-Marxist insights into the theory. In this way, he enriches the Marxist perspective while at the same time enhancing the utility of these borrowed notions. One can see Althusser’s debt to neo-Freudians, particularly Lacan, in the reconceptualization of ideology as a dynamic, ongoing process through which subjects are created. Althusser has thus laid the groundwork for the development of a Marxist concept of ideology radically different from those theories, which proceeded it. The number of prominent Marxist theorists who have elaborated on as well as criticized Althusser’s theory attests to its importance.

Poulantzas

Poulantzas’ contribution to the theory of ideology is largely that of an elaboration, departing from Althusser much less than the other theorists we will review. Poulantzas elaborates on the function of ideology by developing the theory at the level of the social formation (1973, 1974). He is less concerned with the “micro” analysis regarding how class subjects become constituted and more concerned with specifying the relationship between class ideologies and the dominant ideology in a social formation. In doing so, he resolves the apparent contradiction between two versions of ideology found in Marxist theory: (1) that social being determines social consciousness and (2) that “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas” (Marx, 1969:47, also 25).

The first version views ideology as lived experience. The different lived relations of each class determine the way class subjects perceive and give meaning to life. The second version is based on the idea that the ruling class is able to impose its belief system on the subordinate classes thus inhibiting the development of a working class ideology. Ideology, as a vehicle of domination, distorts the real conditions of subordination and thereby conceals the real interests of the subordinate classes. In this view, ideology is defined as false-consciousness rather than consciousness. These different perspectives lead to potentially contradictory conclusions. In the first case, one would expect the classes to have very different ideologies; in the second, the ideology of the subordinate class should approximate the world-view of the dominant class (for a discussion see Abercrombie and Turner, 1978).

Poulantzas addresses precisely this problem when he states that earlier versions of ideology from Lukas on have serious ambiguities and errors that result from the conflation of several different issues (1973:197– 204). Both the above conceptualizations of ideology have been characterized by the failure to allow for the relative autonomy of the ideological instance, resulting in a tendential equating of economic position and class ideology in the first version and dominant class and dominant ideology in the second. This tendency to reduce the ideological instance to the economic instance has consequently obscured the relationship of the dominant ideology to both the dominant and subordinate classes.

Poulantzas argues that there are two levels of ideology: first, there are primary class ideologies and ideological sub-ensembles of minor classes, which encompass distinct worldviews; and secondly, apart from these class ideologies, there exists a dominant ideology, which reproduces relations in the social formation as a whole. Poulantzas argues that the dominant ideology is a product of class struggle. Therefore, many ideological elements from the subordinate classes are incorporated into the dominant ideology. Typically, though, the dominant ideology is dominated by the ideology of the dominant class since the structure of social relations is such that this class usually prevails in class struggles.

In reality, the dominant does not simply reflect the interests and conditions of the dominant class but rather the complex political relationships among the factions of the dominant class and between the dominant and subordinate classes. In this way, it serves the dual purpose of organizing the dominant class while co-opting and disorganizing the subordinate classes. This relation is encompassed in the concept hegemony whereby the dominant class manages to represent itself both as internally unified and as unifying the general interests of the people.

While the dominant ideology is usually dominated by the ideology of the dominant class, this is not a necessary relationship. It is possible for dislocations to occur due to the relative autonomy of the ideological, the political, and the economic instances. Poulantzas (1974) illustrates an historical instance of ideological dislocation in his analysis of fascism. Fascism in Germany and Italy was the product of a simultaneous political crisis (crisis of hegemony) and ideological crisis (crisis of the dominant ideology). The subordinate classes were then in a position to replace the dominant ideology with one more adapted to their interests. In the case of both Germany and Italy, the working class was also undergoing ideological crisis, resulting in the petty bourgeoisie assuming the leading role in forging a new dominant ideology.

Poulantzas’ distinction between the ideology of the dominant class and the dominant ideology resolves the confusion entailed in viewing ideology as “lived experience” as well as a mechanism, which tends to obscure the real relations of production. Class ideologies are products of the lived experiences of each class. The dominant ideology is a product of class struggle and, by virtue of its function in class societies, must conceal real contradictions. It is through concealment that the dominant ideology functions to maintain the social formation by presenting the particular lived relations of agents as a part of a relatively coherent unity — “as opposed to science, ideology has the precise function of hiding the real contradictions of reconstituting on an imaginary level a relatively coherent discourse, which serves as the horizon of agent’s experience” (1973:207).

That the limited horizon of ideology obscures recognition of contradictory class interests does not mean that all struggle is excluded. On the contrary, Poulantzas states that the dominance of this ideology is shown by the fact that the dominated classes live their conditions of political existence through the forms of dominant political discourse: often they live even their revolt against the domination of the system within the frame of reference of the dominant legitimacy (1973:223).

Poulantzas criticizes previous Marxist theorizing for generally overstating the function of ideology. What he calls the “Lukacsian problematic” represents ideology as creating the unity of a social formation rather than reflecting it (1973:197– 201). It does so by falling prey to a historicist interpretation of hegemony. According to this problematic, a “hegemonic class becomes the class-subject of history which through its world-view manages to permeate a social formation with its unity and to lead, rather than dominate, by bringing about the ‘active consent’ of the dominated classes” (1973:199). Under such a conception, the subordinate classes would have the same world-view as the dominant class. It would be this universal world-view, which determined social relations.

You hear about it sometimes in the teen pregnancy essays, from friends or friends and wonder how this could happen. A teenage girl gives birth unexpectedly and nobody, sometimes including also the girl even had no idea that she was pregnant. How is this possible? As pregnancy may go unnoticed? Does pregnancy in Teens feels or looks different than in adult women?

How to avoid teenage pregnancy?

Signs of pregnancy are pretty standard regardless of age: it is the absence of menstrual periods, widening of the pelvis, pain or increased sensitivity of the breast, the emergence of feelings of nausea and vomiting, change in food cravings, mood swings and of course weight gain. And it’s not that pregnant teenagers are no such symptoms, and that they do not recognize in them signs of pregnancy.

When it comes to sex and pregnancy, some adolescents cling to outdated myths, for example “I’m only 13 years old, I can’t get pregnant” or “this is my first time and the first time you can’t get pregnant”.

Does access to condoms prevent teen pregnancy?

Pregnant teenagers as well as adults having sex. And carry a pregnancy they also. If teenagers and miss the signs of her pregnancy, so it is because they have not received correct information from their peers, friends, from magazines or other sources. Or did not receive information at all.

Puberty is one of the reasons why some Teens may miss the signs of their own pregnancy. Teenagers and particularly young teenagers, has seen many external changes to your body and its functions. Early pregnancy signs are easily confused with normal changes that occur with the onset of puberty.

Knowing this, it is easy to imagine that uneducated about sex a young girl could write off the early signs of pregnancy common in this age of body modification? It is important to understand what changes occur in puberty, but too many teenagers are extremely ill-informed about such things.

Body changes in puberty can hide a pregnancy in different ways. Growth patterns can mask the early stages of pregnancy. Teenagers grow in phases. They pass through a phase of completeness when they gain weight, and it is followed by a phase of rapid growth, when they become higher. It is so common model of development in Teens that sudden weight gain is not a reason to sound the alarm.

Besides, newborns adolescents are often smaller in size than children born to older women. Have a teenage pregnancy may become noticeable, not so fast and not so clearly, for example, only 7 months pregnant. A pregnant teenager, refusing to admit the obvious, you may think that she’s just gaining a little weight.

Denial of pregnancy – the biggest mistake teenagers. This is the reason why they often fail to notice a pregnancy, or possible, but in the later stages.

Most Teens believe that pregnancy is something they just will never happen. Many teenagers think that they are too young to get pregnant. They think that if their body is still in the stage of puberty, they can’t get pregnant. Perhaps for this reason, when it comes to sex, teenagers behave recklessly.

Primary prevention of teenage pregnancy

Despite the desire to avoid the onset of an unplanned pregnancy, sometimes this happens and more often than know about it through the media. Many simply ignore about that. His private life all try to keep away from environment, so do not be surprised if even those people, with whom you talk all the time, didn’t tell you about it. It is their right.

If you realize that you’re pregnant, seek medical help. Also, talk with an adult you trust, or with a friend. This will help you to keep health, no matter what decision you make about your pregnancy.

In pregnant women there are three main ways to handle this situation: she can carry, deliver and raise the child; she can bear a child and pass it to the adoptive parents or the state; she can terminate the pregnancy by making safe abortion for free at the antenatal clinic at the place of residence or another medical facility.

Each of these solutions has its “pros” and “cons”, above which you’ll have to think twice. This is a situation when the conversation with someone can really help. Also it will be useful to obtain information from medical professionals, from books and institutions that provide prenatal care, adoption support, and also provide services of abortion.

If you don’t want to get pregnant, you should refrain from sexual contact or to use a reliable method of contraception and read some teenage pregnancy research papers.